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W e live in a society that is wracked bymoral differences n from abortion
and civil disobedience to sex and welfare
issues. Such pressing issues offer so many
options, qualifications and restatements.
that we often do not even know how to
begin to deal with them. And when we
ourselves manage to work through to a
conclusion we can abide, we find ourselves
confronted by the problem of rhe orher:
how are we to regard those who disagree
with us on such moral issues')
We seemingly have just a few choices
open to us: they. the others. are just
different. expressing an alternative moral
perspective. or deficient, lacking some-
thing that is needed to acknowledge the
truth. If deficient. these others may be
either ignorant. not yet informed of the
truth; or stupid, mentally incapable of
recognizing the truth; or deranged, emo-
tionally incapable of recognizing the truth;
or perverted, unwilling to acknowledge the
truth; or evil, willing to reject the truth.
Given these options eirher we are forced
into embracing a form of ethical relativ-
ism. where we take moral differences mere-
ly to represent a different style of life: or we
are forced into viewing those who differ
from us as inferior -- in knowledge. pyschic
capacity, or in morality.
Most of us tend to gravitate toward an
uncomfortable toleration of those others.
Our toleration is uncomfortable because
there are many views we don't believe we
should tolerate. For instance. I do not
believe we should tolerate male suprem-
acy. white supremacy. homophobia. sys-
tematic neglect of the poor and oppressed.
limited nuclear war, our current Central
America "bring back Vietnam" policy, and
so on. Such points of view should not be
respected, should be ridiculed. and exist to
be rejected. But I do want to tolerate, in
some sense, those who advocate views
different from my own on abortion, euthan-
asia. civil disobedience. human and animal
liberation, and the like. But how can we
--how can I --make this distinction~ Isn't
toleration in itselfinconsistent~ If we really
believe our moral views, and if we have
come to them in a reasoned fashion, then
how can we take such a laissez-faire atti-
tude toward those who disagree with us on
these matters~ Just as we don't allow
people to get away with incorrect views on
science or geography nRome, not Naples.
is the capital of Italy n so we should not
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allow them to get away with "wrong" views
on civil disobedience or abortion.
Yet to follow through the logic of this
understanding of moral differences soon
leads us to an unacceptable state of affairs:
almost everyone is our inferior or even
enemy. We disgree on moral matters with
almost everyone. But the idea that these
others arejust different from us is unaccept-
able. Otherwise. we seem forced into a
situation of moral chaos, where anything
goes. Yet in most of the situations we
confront, these others are neither ignorant
-- they know the pertinent moral data nnor
unable n what they don't know they can
learn rather readily. Hence these others are
not stupid or deranged: So what follows is
that those who disagree 'with us are either
perverted or evil. Hence, most of the
people in the world are either perverted or
evil! Surely there is something wrong some-
where: the problem is to determine where.
There are a number of options open to us,
all of which have complications. Let me
mention, briefly. two. One way out is to
refine the notion of relativism by allowing
that those with whom we disagree are
merely different but by also insisting that
there are boundaries to these differences.
:'-lot everything goes. This restrained view
of relativism would allow for a divergence
within our moral view. but only up to a
point. For exa m pie, we n I -- would wa nt to
forbid apartheid as a legitimate moral
position and yet at the same time allow for
substantial differences on such issues as
abortion, euthanasia. and civil disobed-
ience. The problem. of course, is to make
coherent sense of such a view. How can a
perspective be both absolutistic and relativ-
istic? How could the distinction between
what is absolutely condemned and what
leaves room for real divergence be consis-
tently drawn~
The other way out is to widen or expand
the ideas of ignorance or stupidity so as to
include us as well. Following this alterna-
tive, we would distinguish between moral
matters about which we knoll' -- e.g., that
racism or sexism is wrong n and other
moral concerns about which we are nor
clear --e.g., that civil disobediance or
abortion is at times permissible. But once
again, how do we make this distinction?
How is it that we can know certain moral
claims and not know others~ How, for
example, can we claim to know that racism
is wrong and not know that certain cases of
abortion are wrong? To reply by a meta-
phor. for example. that we see through a
glass darkly, doesn't help. For how is it
that we know that we see through a glass
darkly on certain issues and not on others~
And what does it -- could it nmean to say
that we see moral matters darkly? Or is it
also that we see rhis, that we see through a
glass darkly, darkly?
I do believe that the difficulties of one of
these views can be satisfactorily addressed.
But it takes a long story. It involves in
particular a careful analysis of our notions
of morality and knowledge. For instance.
is it possible to have knowledge which
allows for disagreement? We might be
inclined to say that we can have inductive
knowledge which turns out false: we may
be willing to say that we know that some-
thing which occurs less than once out of a
million times will not happen this time. On
this basis we fly on planes and drive cars
without fearing(too much) for our lives. It
is possible, then, to have moral knowledge
which allows for legitimate disagreement
among moral agents, where the agents who
disagree can yet be said to have knowledge.
What we see in such questions as these is
one of the central problems of our day and
of our country. Without a satisfactory
reply to such questions it becomes very
difficult to see how our democracy can
have a theoretical basis. For democracy is
that one's fellow citizens deserve respect
nnotjust in the sense of being given a vote,
but also in the senses of being guaranteed
such "rights" as a chance to be competitive
and a way of making one's views known.
Yet how can one respect those who differ
from one's deepest beliefs? Must they not
instead be ridiculed, hounded, and
silenced~
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